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In the less affluent areas of U.S. cities, when 
neighborhoods revitalize, observers have long 
chalked it up to gentrification. The popular 
image is of an influx of “gentry”—solidly mid-
dle class and especially upper-middle class— 
which has transformed a poor or working-class 
area of the central city into a middle-class 
enclave.1 The losers of the process are the dis-
placed, while the winners include those who 
benefit from the new profitability of these 
areas: some new residents and some existing 
residents, but most of all those who stand to 
benefit from the accumulation of capital in 
entire neighborhoods—large financial institu-
tions and the cities themselves.2
How might we characterize this phenomenon 
in the twenty-first century, when a weakened 
middle class lacks the wherewithal to spur 
wholesale transformation, and in any case, the 
central city no longer has many working-class 
neighborhoods left to gentrify? In the past, gen-
trification was clearly related to the dynamic of 
uneven development—the devaluation of capi-
tal and the subsequent shift of accumulation 
processes into devalued neighborhoods. But 
now, even this uneven development process 
seems less pronounced at first glance, as the ini-
tial “rent gap” has long since been recaptured.3
Thirty years ago, theorists had already 
pointed out that gentrification is a “chaotic con-
ception” that masks complex multiple pro-
cesses; gentrifiers are a diverse set, often 
including households that look quite similar to 
the displaced.4 Yet arguably, there is increasing 
coalescence now around one particular pattern: 
The only households truly insulated from 
displacement belong to upper-income groups, 
particularly the one percent. Where uneven 
development previously spread profit across 
residents of different income levels, now the 
gains accrue mostly to the few who supply lux-
ury housing to a high-income niche.
While the dynamic of uneven 
development pressures policy 
makers to prioritize new 
construction, policies focused on 
labor and income . . . might be more 
effective. 
At the core of this displacement crisis is 
income inequality driven by declining real 
wages—in other words, a labor question brought 
on by the reorganization of work. What is widely 
viewed as a housing crisis, then, is actually an 
income crisis.5 Framing it as a housing crisis 
leads to building more housing supply in the 
central city to alleviate market pressures. This 
approach well suits the financial and develop-
ment industry, as overbuilding in the suburbs in 
the 2000s, and the subsequent foreclosure crisis, 
has made it challenging to realize significant 
profit in the suburbs. It may not, however, miti-
gate the displacement pressures on central city 
neighborhoods.6 While the dynamic of uneven 
development pressures policy makers to priori-
tize new construction, policies focused on labor 
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and income—including human capital develop-
ment, wage subsidies, targeted business assis-
tance, and/or preservation of industrial 
land—might be more effective.
A case in point is that of the San Francisco 
Bay Area. San Francisco has experienced an 
extremely tight housing market in recent years 
due to strong job growth in the tech industry 
and changing housing preferences, among other 
factors.7 The patterns in the San Francisco 
housing market are generally similar to those in 
other strong market regions such as New York, 
Boston, Denver, and Washington, D.C., except 
that the peaks and troughs of its real estate 
cycles make it an extreme case.
Revisiting the Debates: 
Gentrification and Displacement
The long-standing debate over the causes of 
gentrification offers lessons that are still rele-
vant today.8 The demand-side school, repre-
sented mostly by geographers and sociologists, 
claimed that gentrification was caused by 
demographic factors that drove increased 
demand for urban residences, a changing eco-
nomic base that created a large number of 
white-collar jobs in the city center, and the 
mainstreaming of an urban aesthetic pioneered 
first by artists and alternative households. The 
supply-side school, represented largely by 
Marxist geographers, in contrast, held that gen-
trification is driven by capitalist interests, espe-
cially property owners and the real estate and 
financial industries, profiting from a cycle of 
disinvestment and reinvestment in land and 
property and capitalizing on the rent gap. 
Facilitated not just by private capital invest-
ment, but also by public policy and investment, 
the return of capital from the suburbs to the city 
drives gentrification; the change in neighbor-
hoods is the spatial manifestation of the restruc-
turing of capital accumulation, in a process of 
uneven development. Interestingly, this initial 
debate generally equated gentrification with 
displacement, without interrogating the rela-
tionship further.
It was not until the twenty-first century that 
the economists and urban planners began 
weighing in. For most, the key issue was not so 
much the causes of gentrification but whether it 
led to displacement. Most of this research has 
found that exclusionary displacement is occur-
ring in gentrifying neighborhoods: in-movers 
are wealthier, whiter, and of higher educational 
attainment and out-movers are more likely to be 
renters, poorer, and people of color.9 This 
research also consistently shows that rent 
appreciation and high-rent burden (relative to 
income) predict displacement, but that gentrifi-
cation per se does not. Instead, a number of 
studies have shown that various types of dis-
placement pressures, such as landlord harass-
ment and uncertainty associated with the 
planning of new public infrastructure, as well 
as the variety of displaced households, are not 
captured well by census and housing survey 
data.10
Insightful as this research is, by focusing 
only on gentrification, it offers a narrow lens 
that misses the bigger displacement crisis. Only 
by shifting the focus from certain neighbor-
hoods to the nature of advanced capitalism 
itself does the full crisis of displacement come 
into view. As urban studies professor Damaris 
Rose highlighted some thirty years ago: “The 
social and spatial restructuring of labour pro-
cesses are shaping and changing the ways that 
people and labour power are reproduced in cit-
ies.”11 She identified a transformation that was 
characterized by the loss of manufacturing jobs, 
decline of labor unions, and reduced job secu-
rity, and that continues today with stagnant or 
declining wages in both the private and public 
sectors and declining upward mobility. At the 
same time, this transformation is producing dif-
ferent kinds of gentrifiers. A new division of 
labor produces high-end workers with new 
demand for urban housing, while the rise of 
low-wage and informal work, self-employment, 
contingent work, and unconventional career 
ladders helps foster the rise of alternative 
households and non-nuclear families.
Many of these service economy workers find 
themselves excluded from traditional middle-
class housing markets. Householders with multi-
ple jobs or employed women with children 
looking for a central location end up becoming 
displacers themselves, either because they are 
priced out of their previous urban neighborhoods 
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or because work-life complications make conven-
tional suburban life impossible. In other words, 
rather than resulting from lifestyle choices, or 
even housing market dynamics, gentrification 
serves as a coping strategy for the social problems 
incumbent in advanced capitalism: the challenges 
of making daily schedules and budgets work 
despite poor job quality and city transportation 
systems designed for a commute by a sole bread-
winner head of household.
. . . Rather than resulting from 
lifestyle choices, or even housing 
market dynamics, gentrification 
serves as a coping strategy for 
the social problems incumbent in 
advanced capitalism . . . 
Gentrification, then, is just one symptom of a 
much larger crisis. From the onset of the gentrifi-
cation studies, researchers failed to examine a 
wide array of causes—of both gentrification and 
displacement—and looked only at short time 
frames that could not capture the entirety of 
change. That story is told elsewhere; here, it will 
suffice to point out that how the crisis is framed—
narrowly or broadly, short or long term—matters 
because it leads to different policy implications.12 
If the issue is that there is not enough central city 
housing to accommodate demand, then the solu-
tion is to build more housing in those neighbor-
hoods. But if it is that low- and moderate-income 
households are not able to find and stay in housing 
anywhere, then it is an income crisis, necessitat-
ing intervention in the labor market. On one hand, 
this means ensuring that workers are earning a 
“housing wage,” enough to cover rent without 
spending more than 30 percent of their income on 
housing costs.13 On the other hand, it means safe-
guarding the middle-wage, low-skill jobs left in 
the city—those paying a living wage for workers 
without a college degree—whether through 
strengthening unionization, providing targeted 
business assistance, or protecting industrial land.
For the typical worker, wages in real terms 
are now below what they were in the late 1970s, 
when many of these studies were taking place. 
Arguably, the working class of today includes 
the middle class, putting further pressure on the 
need for affordable housing. Yet, even as the 
need grows, the amount decreases, as high-
income households occupy the older housing 
stock that used to trickle down. And the income 
inequality of today—made worse by the eco-
nomic “recovery” from the Great Recession—
is reshaping the map of displacement, as the 
case of the San Francisco Bay Area illustrates.
Twenty-First Century 
Displacement in the San 
Francisco Bay Area
The San Francisco Bay Area illustrates the 
breadth of the displacement crisis, the role of 
increasing income inequality, and the push for 
new housing supply as the solution. The Urban 
Displacement Project provides a typology anal-
ysis that characterizes Bay Area neighborhoods 
(census tracts) according to their experience of 
gentrification and risk of displacement.14 This is 
based upon a gentrification index (defined as a 
vulnerable neighborhood with disproportionate 
growth in above-median-income, college-edu-
cated households, as well as disproportionate 
investment in the form of housing price appre-
ciation, and/or market-rate construction). 
However, it looks at not just gentrification but 
also displacement, which is measured by three 
different proxies: the loss of low-income house-
holds, the loss of naturally occurring affordable 
housing, and/or the declining in-migration of 
low-income residents.15 The Urban Displacement 
Project divides the Bay Area region into low-
income and moderate-high income census tracts 
to capture the displacement pressures not just in 
gentrifying neighborhoods, but also in non-gen-
trifying neighborhoods that are also losing or 
excluding low-income households. The analysis 
shows that displacement risk is not just in low-
income neighborhoods, but in moderate- to 
high-income neighborhoods as well (Figure 1).
Overall, just over 10 percent of Bay Area 
households (a total of more than 265,000) live 
in neighborhoods that are undergoing gentrifi-
cation or have gentrified already. From 2000 to 
2013, the nine-county region has lost almost 
105,900 naturally occurring affordable housing 
units—but just 12 percent of these were located 
in gentrifying neighborhoods, such as those 
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near downtown San Francisco and Oakland. 
Overall, the region lost 49,000 low-income 
households, but just 13 percent were displaced 
from gentrified neighborhoods. In fact, though 
53 percent of low-income households lived in 
neighborhoods at risk of or already experienc-
ing displacement pressures, more than half of 
those neighborhoods are moderate-to-high 
income areas. In other words, due to price 
increases either low-income households can no 
longer afford to live in these areas, or they are 
excluded from moving in when units formerly 
inhabited by low-income households become 
available. This phenomenon is occurring par-
ticularly among communities of color, espe-
cially Latinos.
. . . [T]he income inequality 
of today—made worse by the 
economic “recovery” from the 
Great Recession—is reshaping the 
map of displacement . . . 
Not only is displacement occurring in all 
types of neighborhoods, but it occurs dispropor-
tionately to moderate-income households. 
Overall, the region gained in both high- and 
low-income households from 2000 to 2013; 
though gentrified neighborhoods gained both 
income groups, a disproportionate share of 
high-income households moved in (Figure 2). 
However, the entire region experienced a net 
loss of moderate-income households (a total of 
36,000). At the same time, rent burden increased, 
not only for low-income households but house-
holds in general, especially in gentrified neigh-
borhoods (Figure 3). Meanwhile, much of the 
region saw middle-class households replaced by 
lower- and upper-class households (Figure 4). 
Taken together, these patterns suggest the 
breadth of displacement processes and the 
impact of the loss of the middle class.
Particularly in the Bay Area then, one would 
expect the policy response to the displacement 
crisis to be multipronged, with interventions to 
improve incomes, preserve housing affordability, 
and build new supply.17 Instead, there has been a 
steady drumbeat of demands to increase housing 
supply, encapsulated ably in the title of a 2016 
New York Times article: “In Cramped and Costly 
Bay Area, Cries to Build, Baby, Build.”18 The 
arguments come not just from pro-growth groups 
like the San Francisco Bay Area Renter’s 
Federation and San Francisco Planning and 
Urban Research, but also reach up to the state, 
where the Legislative Analyst’s Office has 
released several reports advocating dramatic 
increases in housing supply to ease price pres-
sures, and the governor has suggested allowing 
more housing development by right, that is, 
without requiring approval for individual 
Figure 1. Distribution of displacement/gentrification types—San Francisco Bay Area.
Source. Calculations by the author.
Note. MHI = moderate- to high-income neighborhood; LI = low-income neighborhood.
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projects.19 Blocking more development are a well- 
established set of barriers: NIMBYism, the envi-
ronmental review process, restrictive zoning reg-
ulations, and slow permitting processes. The 
pro-development point of view dominates the 
national conversation as well. A quick search of 
the top twenty-two urban blogs in the United 
States and United Kingdom yields thirty-eight 
articles focused exclusively on the housing 
affordability crisis; of these, twenty-nine mention 
housing production as the solution, while twenty-
two focus on preservation (sixteen mention 
both).20 Even the White House’s recent Housing 
Development Toolkit calls for eliminating the 
barriers to housing production—without provid-
ing any evidence of a shortage in supply.21
Yet, we might ask whether there is actually a 
widespread shortage of housing. In fact, in the 
aggregate, housing construction nationwide is 
well aligned with household growth, due in part 
to slow household formation in recent years.22 
Just under ten years ago, when the housing 
market collapsed, there was actually a glut of 
vacant homes: both rental and homeowner 
Figure 2. Change in households, gentrified versus all neighborhoods, 2000 to 2013—San Francisco Bay 
Area.
Source. Calculations by the author.
Figure 3. All rent-burdened and low-income rent-burdened households, gentrified versus all 
neighborhoods, 2000 and 2013—San Francisco Bay Area.
Source. Calculations by the author.
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vacancy rates hit historic highs. In the decade 
of the 2000s in the Bay Area, developers built 
almost twice as many units than were needed 
for new households (Figure 5)—albeit mostly 
in the wrong places, outlying suburbs. In the 
future, surpluses may return, as aging baby 
boomers leave their single-family homes for 
more efficient living arrangements.23 In the 
long run, do we really need market-rate housing 
produced at a faster rate? Perhaps, instead, we 
need to revisit the rules of the game, once again, 
to ensure that the core areas where we need 
housing most remain affordable in the face of 
rising income inequality.
. . . [W]e need to . . . ensure that the 
core areas where we need housing 
most remain affordable in the face 
of rising income inequality. 
There is little question that major cities such as 
San Francisco, New York, and London have not 
built enough housing to meet demand for central 
city living. But this does not necessarily mean that 
these cities can build their way out of the problem 
today.24 The cost—of a minimum of $500,000 for 
an eight hundred square foot unit in a city like San 
Francisco, with land costs accounting for just one-
fourth of the total—means that in the absence of 
subsidy, it is only profitable for developers to 
build for the high end of the market, which is why 
we currently have a glut of ultra-luxury apart-
ments.25 This new construction will take genera-
tions to filter down to those in need of affordable 
housing, and in any case, massive amounts of 
construction would be needed to have any level-
ing effect on housing prices.26
It is precisely because of the high land costs in 
the urban core that developers increasingly are 
pressuring cities to rezone industrial land for resi-
dential use. Ironically, in many cities, this land 
houses the most significant concentrations of 
middle-wage jobs. A study of industrial land in 
the Bay Area I conducted for the Association of 
Bay Area Governments found that in 2011, mid-
dle-wage jobs (paying $18 to $30 per hour, and 
employing workers without a college degree) 
counted for a near majority (44 percent of jobs on 
industrial land, compared with just 27 percent of 
Figure 5. Household growth and actual housing 
production by decade—San Francisco Bay Area.
Source. Calculations by the author.
Figure 4. Decline of the middle class—San Francisco Bay Area sub-regions.
Source. Adapted from California Budget and Policy Center, 2016.16
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all jobs in the region; Figure 6). Projections to 
2040 suggest that this regional concentration will 
remain stable—unless the land is converted to 
residential. Ironically, the pressure to build more 
housing may actually result in the conversion of 
the land with the greatest concentrations of jobs 
paying a “housing wage.”27
Viewing the crisis through the lens of uneven 
development helps explain the continued push to 
build. Changes in how the country’s major finan-
cial institutions underwrote mortgages facilitated 
capital accumulation in the suburbs, leading to 
overbuilding. With diminishing returns, develop-
ers returned to the city, where they found profit-
ability in the market for luxury apartments. If 
current patterns—land costs, construction costs, 
and so on—do not change significantly, building 
central city housing for the working and middle 
class will never be profitable. Thus, relying exclu-
sively, or even mostly, on a supply strategy is nei-
ther viable nor necessary.
Housing prices have risen much faster than 
incomes, particularly in strong market regions 
such as New York, and in regions with high-
income inequality, low-income households find 
housing less affordable.29 Had incomes kept up, 
the crisis would have been significantly (though 
not fully) mitigated. Yet this perspective is largely 
absent from the debate on the housing crisis. Of 
the above-mentioned thirty-eight national blogs 
focused on the housing crisis, just thirteen framed 
it as an income crisis, and only one mentioned 
intervening in the labor market (e.g., to improve 
wages) as a solution. Of those that mentioned 
income, most highlighted the plight of low-
income households and millennials trying to enter 
the housing market; there was little mention of the 
challenges faced by the middle class.
It makes little sense to dedicate 
resources to saving housing without 
also ensuring the buying power of 
workers. 
It is time to start thinking more creatively 
about policy. The hottest neighborhoods are 
losing naturally affordable housing units—and 
their low- and moderate-income occupants— 
much faster than they can build replacement 
housing. Many creative approaches to housing 
preservation are emerging, and offer potential 
to house more households at lower cost than 
new housing production.30 But why not con-
sider how to preserve residents’ incomes at the 
same time? It makes little sense to dedicate 
resources to saving housing without also ensur-
ing the buying power of workers.
It is not hard also to envision how the 
$500,000 that builds a new housing unit might 
be more fruitfully employed in strategies that 
enhance resident income: full college scholar-
ships for five students, wage subsidies to bring 
thirty minimum wage workers up to living 
wage for a year, wages and benefits for five 
elementary school teachers, finance capital for 
five minority-owned start-ups, or industrial 
space for a handful of expanding businesses. 
Only when we start to think more holistically 
about our housing crises will we be able to pro-
tect our communities from the inequality that is 
displacing us.
Figure 6. Wage distribution of jobs on industrial land in 2011 and 2040, compared with the wage 
distribution for all jobs—San Francisco Bay Area, 2010.
Source. Calculations by the author.28
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